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Abstract 
This article re-examines real interest parity (RIP), focusing upon which 
component of real interest parity drives convergence to parity.  We find that it is the 
reversion of inflation rather than nominal interest rates which is the primary source of 
convergence to RIP. Nominal interest rate differentials are found to be persistent during 
both periods. Furthermore, we additionally find that mean reversion in the inflation 
differentials is faster during the Gold Standard period.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Real interest rate parity is one of the cornerstones of international finance. It states that real 
interest rates in the domestic country equal real interest rates in the foreign country. While 
evidence in favour of this theory in this strong form is rather sparse, there is much broader 
support for a weaker form of the theory that states that real interest rates converge towards 
real interest rate parity. Nevertheless, there has been remarkably little work investigating 
which component of the real interest parity condition drives its longer term convergence. 
Chung and Crowder (2004) note that real interest rate parity is based upon four relationships 
holding: relative purchasing power parity, uncovered interest rate parity, the Fisher effect in 
the domestic country and the Fisher effect in the foreign country. Chung and Crowder (2004) 
provide some initial evidence on whether the four conditions for interest rate parity hold 
during the post-World War II sample period. They report that evidence indicates that the 
failure of uncovered interest parity is the dominant factor that leads to the failure of RIP.  
In this paper we extend this analysis in two respects. First, we examine separately 
different exchange rate regimes: the Gold Standard period and the post-Bretton Woods period 
where floating exchange rate regimes predominate (following Dreger, 2010 for real interest 
parity). Second, and most importantly, we test which component is most important in driving 
convergence towards interest rate parity; to be specific we i) estimate the speed of mean-
reversion for each component of the real parity relationship and ii) examine the extent to 
which the nominal interest rate differentials and inflation differentials commove with RIP.  
We note that the difference in real interest rates equals the nominal interest rate differential 
minus the inflation differential, which also equals the real interest rate in the domestic 
country minus the real interest rate in the foreign country.  Consequently, we examine the 
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speed of mean reversion of the inflation differential, the nominal interest rate differential, the 
real interest rate in the domestic country and the real interest rate in the foreign country.  
 
II. BACKGROUND – REAL INTEREST PARITY 
 
Real interest rate parity (RIP) in its strictest form simply states that the expected domestic 
real interest rate is equal to the expected foreign real interest rate:  
*
, 1 , 1t t t t t tE r E r+ +=                  (1) 
where E is expectations, t denotes the time period, r is the real interest rate and an asterisk 
denotes the foreign country.  
 Table 1 presents a summary of the literature on RIP and provides further details on 
the data span, countries examined and findings. The early literature finds little evidence to 
support this strict form of RIP (see e.g., Mishkin, 1981, 1984; Cumby and Obstfeld, 1984; 
Mark, 1985) as shown in Table 1. That is, the equality of real interest rates is rejected. 
 Subsequent literature has examined a weaker form of RIP that tests if real interest 
rates converge towards parity. For example, there is some evidence from unit root tests that 
the real interest rate differential ( *, 1 , 1RID t t t t t tE r E r+ += − ) is stationary amongst major 
developed economies (see e.g. Meese and Rogoff, 1988; Cavaglia, 1992; Edison and Pauls, 
1993), while UIP is supported in Asian economies (Moosa and Bhatti, 1997).  More recent 
work finds evidence for RIP using cointegation methods amongst developed markets (e.g. 
Awad and Goodwin, 1998; Wu and Fountas, 2000) and emerging markets (e.g. Chinn and 
Frankel, 1995; Phylaktis, 1999). Panel unit root techniques offer another way to enhance test 
power by incorporating cross sectional variation in the panel. The studies using panel data to 
raise power find strong evidence favouring RIP (e.g.,Wu and Chen, 1998; Holmes, 2002; 
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Baharumshah et al., 2005). Holmes (2002) reports that the half-life for adjustment to RIP 
occurs within several months, while Ferreira and León-Ledesma (2007) note that adjustment 
to RIP is quicker in emerging markets than in developed markets. Notably, Camarero et al. 
(2009) tested for RIP using panel unit root and stationarity tests with cross-sectional 
dependence, and found evidence against RIP among the 19 major OECD countries.  
Some literature has attempted to focus on the ex-ante real interest rate more directly by 
modelling or proxying for expected inflation. Using a VAR, Driffill and Snell (2003) find 
real ex-ante interest rates respond to nominal shocks. Kandel, Ofer and Sarig (1996) use 
indexed bonds to infer inflation expectations; their results suggest a negative correlation 
between ex-ante real interest rates and expected inflation. Neither studies’ key result seems 
consistent with the Fisher hypothesis (or weak-form RIP). Herwartz and Roestel (2011) using 
inflation indexed bonds find there is convergence of long-term ex ante real interest rates, 
while prior literature primarily focuses on short-term interest rates; their evidence is 
consistent with weak-form RIP and supports capital market integration amongst the four 
major markets they examine. 
Another recent branch of literature highlights that structural breaks in RIDs are an 
important feature that one should take into account in any empirical testing framework (e.g., 
Fountas and Wu, 1999). By allowing for structural breaks in unit root tests, Fountas and Wu 
(1999) and Arghyrou et al. (2009) find that there is evidence in favour of RIP in the EU 
member countries. 
In this paper we focus on the weaker form of RIP, which considers if real interest rates 
converge towards parity. The vast majority of prior RIP literature focuses on the post-WWII 
period. A notable exception is Dreger (2010), who examines different exchange rate regimes 
including the Gold Standard period. We follow Dreger (2010) by examing the RIP condition 
in both the post-Bretton Woods era and the Gold Standard period. However, we extend 
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Dreger (2010) by decomposing the RIP condition into its separate components in the spirit of 
Chung and Crowder (2004). We also extend Dreger (2010) and Chung and Crowder (2004), 
who focus on whether there is convergence by estimating how quickly convergence occurs.  
[INSERT TABLE 1:] 
We begin the derivation of RIP by noting that the Fisher equation states that the 
expected real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation: 
 , 1 , 1 , 1t t t t t t t tE r i E π+ + += −           (2) 
* * *
, 1 , 1 , 1t t t t t t t tE r i E π+ + += −          (3) 
We then subtract the domestic Fisher equation from the foreign Fisher equation:  
* * *
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tE r E r i i E Eπ π+ + + + + + − = − − −       (4) 
* * *
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tE r E r i E i Eπ π+ + + + + + − = − − −       (5) 
Our study focuses on these two equations, (4) and (5); on the left-hand side is the real 
interest rate differential ( *, 1 , 1RID t t t t t tE r E r+ += −  ). Equation (4) states that RID is comprised of 
two different components; the first is the nominal interest rate differential between the 
domestic and foreign market, and the second is the inflation differential between the domestic 
and foreign market. This paper examines which of these two component of the real interest 
rate differential drives convergence towards real interest rate parity. Is convergence driven by 
the nominal interest rate differential or the inflation differential? 
Equation (5) states that the difference in real interest rates can also be decomposed into 
two other components. First, the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation in the 
domestic country and second, the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation in the foreign 
country. Our main new research inquiries are to: i) to examine if the speed of convergence 
differs between the Gold Standard period and the post-Bretton Woods era, ii) examine how 
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quickly, if at all, each component of RIP converges and iii) analyse the comovement of RIP 
with nominal interest rate different differentials and inflation differentials.  
  
III. METHODOLOGY 
 
 To investigate how quickly each component of RIP converges we examine a typical 
AR(1) regression: 
  1 1it i it ity yα β ε+ += + +          (6) 
where yit+1 is the deviation from real interest rate parity or a component of real interest parity. 
If there is no convergence towards parity in the long term then β will equal 1. If β is less than 
1 (but greater than -1) then there is convergence to parity in the long term. If β is 0 then this 
indicates that there is full adjustment towards parity in one period. 
  To examine the comovement between the RIP and its component parts, the nominal 
interest rate differential and the inflation differential, we use a method proposed by Yetman 
(2011) that provides a measure of comovement at time t between two series x and y, 
computed as the product of their respective z-scores:1 
𝜌𝑡
𝑥𝑥 = (𝑥𝑡−?̅?)
� 1
𝑇−1
∑ (𝑥𝑡−?̅?)2𝑇𝑡=1   . (𝑥𝑡−𝑥�)� 1𝑇−1∑ (𝑥𝑡−𝑥�)2𝑇𝑡=1  = 𝑧𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑥𝑡                               (7) 
This provides a dynamic measure of comovement and allows us to establish the extent of any 
comovement and examine how this comovement may have evolved through time, as such, we 
                                                          
1 As Yetman (2011) points out, up to one-degree of freedom correction, the average of the comovements in each 
time period as given by Equation (7) will equal the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, i.e.  1
𝑇
∑ 𝜌𝑡
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑇−1
𝑇
𝜌𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑡=1  
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construct 𝜌𝑡
𝑥𝑥 for RIP with both nominal interest rate differentials and inflation differentials 
for each country.2 
IV. DATA 
We use the annual dataset on nominal interest rates and inflation for 15 countries 
compiled by Dreger (2010).  The dataset covers the G7 countries as well as some small open 
economies such as Denmark and the Netherlands.  In particular, the countries examined are 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and US. It is taken from Global Financial Data 
(GFD) database prior to 1950 and afterwards from World Market Monitor of Global Insight. 
We focus on two regime periods: the Gold Standard (1870-1914) and the managed float 
(1973-2006). We focus on these two periods for which there is sufficient data to conduct 
empirical analysis on each series.  In the analysis conducted we take the US to be the 
domestic, benchmark market and the remaining 14 countries to be the foreign markets.  As 
such, the analysis examines each foreign market’s currency and interest rates relative to the 
US. 
[INSERT TABLE 2:] 
 
V. EVIDENCE ON CONVERGENCE TOWARDS REAL INTEREST PARITY  
The empirical analysis begins by examining, in a global context, whether there is 
convergence towards RIP in the long-term. There is mounting evidence on this for the recent 
post-WWII sample, however, there is relatively little evidence for the Gold Standard period. 
A notable exception is Dreger (2010), who provides evidence of convergence to RIP during 
the pre WW1 period using panel unit root tests. In contrast to Dreger (2010) we examine RIP 
                                                          
2 Positive values of 𝜌𝑡
𝑥𝑥 imply comovement, i.e. 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡  are either both positive or both negative; whereas, a 
negative value of 𝜌𝑡
𝑥𝑥 implies movement in opposite directions. The relative size of 𝜌𝑡
𝑥𝑥 is indicative of the 
extent of the comovement. 
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for each country and crucially we examine: i) the speed of convergence towards RIP and ii) 
comovement of RIP and its components. In subsequent analysis we consider the components 
of RIP, which are not covered by Dreger (2010).  
[INSERT TABLE 3:] 
Table 3 Panel A presents the relationship between the current (annual) real interest rate 
differential and lagged (annual) real interest rate differential during the Gold Standard period. 
These results provide clear support that there is convergence towards RIP during the Gold 
Standard period.  
Table 3 Panel B reports results for the managed float period (1973-2006).  This enables 
us to examine if in international markets the convergence towards RIP is relatively unaffected 
by changes in exchange rate regime. We find convergence to RIP during the managed float 
period. Intriguingly, the speed of adjustment towards RIP is generally much weaker during 
the managed float period compared to the Gold Standard period. 
The key findings thus far are as follows.  Firstly, there is convergence towards RIP in 
the long run. Secondly, we find that convergence to RIP is much quicker during the Gold 
standard period than during the managed float period.  
One major goal of this paper is to shed more light upon the drivers of the convergence 
towards RIP; this issue is not considered in most prior literature. It could be that nominal 
interest rates are driving this phenomenon; however, it is also possible that inflation or mean-
reverting real interest rates in each country are driving this behavior.  
 
VI. THE DRIVERS OF  REAL INTEREST PARITY CONVERGENCE 
In this section we examine which component of RIP is driving its convergence. An AR 
regression, Equation 6, is estimated for nominal interest rate differentials and inflation 
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differentials separately, over both the Gold Standard and managed float periods, to examine 
which component of RIP is generating the convergence.  
Figure 1 plots the nominal interest rate parity and inflation differentials for each market 
over the Gold Standard and the managed float period. From a visual inspection, it is apparent 
that inflation is far more volatile in the Gold Standard period relative to both nominal interest 
rates and itself in the managed float period. This high volatility is likely due to the Gold 
Standard being a fixed exchange rate and hence only prices could adjust, leading to higher 
inflation volatility. Therefore it may not be surprising that nominal interest rates are more 
volatile than inflation during the float period. 
Table 4 provides AR regression results for nominal interest rate differentials, with the 
aim being to examine if the adjustment towards RIP is driven by nominal interest rates. The 
evidence presented in Table 4 does not support this. In Table 4 Panel A we examine the Gold 
Standard period; we note that nominal interest rate differentials are relatively persistent and 
not necessarily significantly different from 1. These results contrast with those for RIP from 
Table 3, where in almost all cases the hypothesis of no adjustment (β = 1) could be rejected.  
[INSERT TABLE 4:] 
Table 4 Panel B provides results for the managed float period. Again there is little 
statistically significant evidence that nominal interest rate differentials converge in the longer 
term. The coefficient β is not statistically significantly different from 1 in the majority of 
countries at the 5% level. Both Panel A and Panel B of Table 4 indicate that nominal interest 
rates are highly persistent. Furthermore, they suggest that the persistence of nominal interest 
rate differentials are broadly similar during both sub-periods, i.e. during the Gold Standard 
period and the managed float period.  
Table 5 details the speed of adjustment of inflation differentials. Panel A reports results 
for the Gold Standard period. The results suggest that the inflation differentials adjust very 
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rapidly. In fact, in the majority of cases we cannot reject that the β coefficient is equal to 0; 
this implies we cannot reject there being full adjustment within one year (one period). This 
speed of adjustment is much quicker than we reported for RIP in Table 3, suggesting the 
inflation differentials are the main source of adjustment towards RIP. These results are 
clearly in sync with Figure 1, where during the Gold Standard period inflation fluctuated 
considerably in almost all countries in contrast to nominal interest rates.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 AND FIGURE 1:] 
Table 5 Panel B reports results for the 1973-2006 managed float sub-sample. These 
results also indicate there is reversion in inflation differentials. The speed of adjustment is 
slower than that reported for the Gold Standard sub-sample in Panel A. This might be 
because during the floating regime the exchange rates could adjust to reduced price 
differentials between countries and is therefore not dependent upon inflation to bring about 
the adjustment. Further, policymakers might prefer exchange rate adjustment since inflation 
adjustment can be costly. In contrast, during the Gold standard period there was effectively a 
fixed exchange rate, which meant that any adjustment in price levels would be via inflation 
since the exchange rate could not adjust. As before, these results are consistent with Figure 1. 
There is more fluctuation in nominal interest parity during the floating period, but less 
fluctuation in inflation differentials during this later period.  
[INSERT TABLE 6:] 
Table 6 reports results for the speed of adjustment of real interest rates in each country. 
Panel A reports results for the Gold Standard period and Panel B for the managed float period. 
These results suggest real interest rates do mean-revert in each country. However, they also 
suggest that US real interest rates are more persistent than for many other countries. This 
persistence may be a reflection of the fact that US government securities are a major reserve 
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asset held by many other sovereign nations and by many investment groups worldwide. This 
substantial global demand for US securities slows their speed of adjustment.  
The results in Table 6 demonstrate that while there is reversion in real interest rates in 
each country, these are generally more persistent than the inflation differentials reported in 
Table 5. Consequently, it appears inflation differentials are the most important single source 
of convergence towards RIP.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 AND FIGURE 2] 
Table 7 and Figure 2 report the results for the comovement between the RIP and the 
nominal interest rate differentials and inflation differentials respectively.  Table 7 presents the 
descriptive statistics for both pairwise comovements with a distinction made between the 
Gold Standard and the float period, and Figure 2 illustrates how these comovements have 
evolved through time over both periods. 
We find, not surprisingly given Equation 4, that the comovement between RIP and 
nominal interest rate differentials is generally positive, whilst that between RIP and the 
inflation differentials is negative, suggesting large movements in opposite directions. In 
absolute terms, the degree of comovement is greater between RIP and the inflation 
differentials, shown both by Figure 2 and Table 7, indicating as before that the inflation 
differentials are the key drivers of convergence towards RIP. 
Notably, from Figure 2 and the average comovement values in Table 7, it can be seen 
that during the Gold Standard period the magnitude of the comovement between RIP and the 
inflation differentials is greater than that observed for the managed float period.  Whereas 
similar comovement between RIP and the nominal interest rate differential is observed in 
both periods.    This corroborates earlier findings, as presented in Figure 1 and Tables 4 to 6, 
of large fluctuations in inflation during this period with rapid adjustments in inflation 
differentials.  This can be explained by the pressure on inflation to adjust to reduce price 
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differentials given the fixed exchange rate. During the managed float period the exchange 
rate was free to adjust, thus easing the pressure on inflation, hence in Figure 2 we observe 
comovements for nominal interest rate differentials and inflation differentials each with the 
RIP of similar magnitude. 
The empirical results provide important evidence on the source of convergence towards 
RIP. Here we estimated the speed of adjustment of three possible factors: nominal interest 
differentials, inflation differentials and each countries’ real interest rate. Empirical results 
clearly indicate that inflation differentials are the quickest component to adjust and comove 
to a greater extent with RIP, while nominal interest rate differentials adjust sluggishly and 
comove with RIP to a lesser extent.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article provides new insights on the RIP relationship by i) examining the speed of 
adjustment towards RIP, ii) examining which component drives adjustment towards RIP and 
iii) by examining RIP during different exchange rate regimes. First, we find there is 
adjustment towards RIP in the long run. Second, and importantly, we find that this is driven 
by reversion in inflation differentials and not by reversion in nominal interest rates.  
Finally, we examine if reversion of RIP and its components is dependent upon the 
exchange rate regime and time period studied. Interestingly, we find that inflation 
differentials drive convergence towards RIP in both sub-periods; however, inflation 
differentials converge more rapidly and comove with RIP to a greater extent during the Gold 
Standard period rather than the recent managed float.  During a fixed exchange rate regime, 
such as the Gold Standard, inflation is the primary mechanism by which price levels across 
countries can become more aligned. By contrast, during floating regimes both inflation and 
the exchange rate can adjust which reduces the pressure on inflation to adjust. The speed of 
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adjustment of inflation may also partly reflect the fact that inflation differentials were more 
volatile during the Gold Standard period; it is plausible that smaller deviations frictions like 
menu costs could inhibit convergence. More generally, our empirical results underline that 
one should not tacitly assume that convergence towards RIP is through rapid adjustment of 
nominal interest rates.  
This paper provides important evidence that distinguishes between the different drivers 
of convergence towards RIP in the long term. Our evidence is that inflation differentials 
adjust much more quickly than nominal interest rates and comove more strongly with RIP; 
hence it is inflation that drives convergence towards RIP. This result has two important 
implications. First, if convergence towards RIP is driven by inflation rather than the financial 
markets then using RIP to gauge the degree of capital market integration for a country (see 
e.g. Phylaktis, 1999 and Alexakis et al., 1997) would appear to have serious shortcomings. 
Second, it suggests that nominal interest rates converge slowly; it therefore suggests that 
central banks can and do follow at least partially independent monetary policies (Mark, 1985). 
We also find that the speed of convergence of inflation differentials differs across the two 
exchange rate regimes we consider. During the Gold Standard period inflation was much less 
persistent than during the managed float period. Consequently, we report that overall 
convergence towards RIP was much quicker during the Gold Standard period than the recent 
post-Bretton Woods sample.   
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   TABLE 1 
Summary of Literature 
 
Study Period Countries Method + Test Approach Main Results 
Mishkin (1981) 1953Q1 – 
1979Q4 
US Simple regression; 
Correlation 
Rejects that the real interest rate is constant. Also finds that movements in nominal interest 
rates are not a reliable indicator of movements in real rates. 
Mishkin (1984) 1967Q2- 
1979Q2 
7 Developed 
Markets (US, Canada, UK, 
France, West Germany, 
Netherlands and 
Switzerland). 
Simple regression; Tests 
equality of real interest 
rates 
Little support for equality of real interest rates. 
Suggests this could be due to risk premiums in the forward exchange market rather than 
irrationality or unexploited profit opportunities. 
Cumby and Obstfeld 
(1984) 
1976M1-
1981M9 
6 Developed Markets (US, 
UK, Germany, 
Switzerland, Canada and 
Japan) 
Simple regression; Tests of 
homoscedastic forecast 
errors. 
Little support for equality of real interest rates. 
Inflation and exchange rate forecast errors are conditionally heteroscedastic. 
Mark (1985) 1973M5- 
1982M2 
7 Developed Markets (US, 
Canada, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands and UK) 
Simple regression Very little support for equality of real interest rates net of tax. Limited support for equality of 
real interest rates after tax. 
Meese and Rogoff 
(1988) 
1974M2- 
1986M3 
4 Developed Markets (US, 
Germany, Japan and UK) 
Simple regression;  
Unit Root Test. 
First, the data do not indicate a strong correspondence between real interest rate differentials 
(short-term or long-term) and real exchange rates.  
Second, some evidence of a unit root in long-term (but not short-term) real interest 
differentials. Thus short-term interest rates appear to converge towards RIP but not long-term 
interest rates. 
Cavaglia (1992) 1973M1-
1987M12 
4 Developed Markets 
(US, Germany, 
Switzerland and 
Netherlands) 
State Space Model with 
Kalman Filter 
Supports convergence of RIDs.  Ex-ante real interest differentials for the period 1973–1987 are 
found to be relatively short-lived and mean-reverting to zero. 
Edison and Pauls 
(1993) 
1974Q1-
1990Q4 
Major Developed 
Markets (US, Japan, 
Germany, UK, Canada, G-
10) 
Unit Root Test;  
Cointegration 
Little evidence of mean reversion in real interest differential. 
The respective real exchange rates and real interest rates, and most of their constituent series, 
are nonstationary. Further, interest rates are not cointegrated with exchange rates. 
Chinn and Frankel 
(1995) 
1982Q3- 
1992Q1 
Pacific Rim countries 
(Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Taiwan, Korea, Thailand 
and Singapore; Japan and 
US base countries) 
Stochastic Cointegration RIP is supported for most Pacific Rim countries. Hong Kong, Malaysia and Taiwan are linked with 
both the USA and Japan (in terms of cointegration and positive covariation), while only 
Singapore is solely linked with the USA. On the other hand Korea, and perhaps Indonesia and 
Thailand appear to be more closely linked with Japan. Real interest parity holds for only the 
following interest rate pairs: USA-Singapore, USA-Taiwan and Japan-Taiwan. 
Kandel, Ofer and Sarig 
(1996) 
1984M9-
1992M3 
Israel Unit Root Test and Simple 
regression 
Use indexed bonds and nominal bonds to infer inflation expectations. Results suggest a negative 
correlation between ex-ante real interest rates and expected inflation contrary to the Fisher 
hypothesis, which predicts a positive correlation.    
Moosa and Bhatti 
(1997) 
1980-1994 Asian economies Test UIP and ex-ante PPP. Find strong support for both UIP and ex-ante PPP in almost all cases. 
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Awad and Goodwin 
(1998) 
1976-1994 
(Weekly) 
G10 countries Cointegration Support convergence towards RIP, especially in the long run. US appears to play a leading role.  
Wu and Chen (1998) 1979M1-
1996M9 
Euro money market Panel Unit Root Strong evidence rejecting null of equality of real interest rates. Support for mean-reversion in 
RIDs. 
Phylaktis (1999) At most 
1973M8-
1993M9; 
depends on 
country 
Pacific Basin countries Cointegration; Impulse 
Response Functions (IRFs) 
Support long run comovement in real interest rates. Pacific-Basin countries are also more 
closely linked with Japan than US. 
Wu and Fountas (2000) 1974-1995 G7 against US Cointegration allowing for 
endogenous structural 
change 
Their evidence in favour of run co-movement in real interest rates both in the long-run and in 
the short-run. The short run results contrast sharply with the lack of RIP suggested by the 
traditional econometric methodology that doesn’t account for structural breaks. 
Holmes (2002) 1979-1998 Major European Union 
countries 
Univariate ADF; Panel unit 
root test 
Strong evidence of “onshore RIP” during 1986-1990 and 1993-1998, but no evidence of RIP 
during 1990-1992. During periods where convergence towards RIP is found the estimated half-
life for adjustment is rapid at 2-3 months. 
Drifill and Snell (2003) 1957Q1-
1994Q4 
Five industrialized 
nations 
Vector Autoregression 
(VAR)  
Examine the extent to which real ex-ante interest rates respond to nominal and to real shocks 
using a VAR model for 5 major economies. Their analysis suggests an important role for nominal 
shocks especially during the 1980s. 
Chung and Crowder 
(2004) 
1960-1996 Five industrialized 
nations 
Tests the components of 
RIP. 
Do not support RIP. Examine the components of RIP to examine what causes the rejection of 
RIP. No single violation can explain the failure of RIP in all cases. 
Ferreira and León-
Ledesma (2007) 
Different 
ranges for 
different 
countries 
Developed and  Emerging 
Markets 
Unit Root Test of RIDs.  Convergence towards RIP is quicker in emerging markets (half-life c. 4 months) compared to 
developed markets (half-life c. 11 months). 
Camarero et al. (2009) 1978Q1-
2006Q1 
19 Major OECD countries Panel Unit Root and Panel 
Stationarity Tests. Allow 
for cross-sectional 
dependence. 
Evidence against convergence to RIP. They find that one of the common factors in real interest 
rate differentials is non-stationary. 
Arghyrou et al. (2009) 1996-2005 25 EU countries Standard ADF. Allow for 
structural breaks. 
Generally RIDs converge. However, convergence of RIDs is gradual and the speed of 
convergence depends upon how structural breaks are modelled. 
Dreger (2010) 1870-2006 14 developed countries Panel Unit Root Test; Test 
if all real interest rates 
have a unit root. 
Across different exchange rate regimes, the null hypothesis of all countries RID’s following a unit 
root can be rejected. 
Herwartz and Roestel 
(2011) 
2000M1-
2010M1 
4 Developed Markets 
(Canada, France, UK and 
US) 
 
Unit Root Test;  
Cointegration 
Use inflation indexed bonds to examine if there is convergence of long-term ex ante real 
interest rates, while prior literature primarily focuses on short-term interest rates. RIDs are 
stationary and there is bivariate cointegration in all long-term RIR’s examined. This evidence 
supports capital market integration amongst the major markets they examine. 
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  TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
   
1872-1914  
 
1973-2006 
  
RIP i – i* π – π* i- π  RIP    i – i* π – π* i- π  
AUSTRALIA     Mean 26.68 31.45 4.77 345.39  27.20 169.24 142.05 348.47  
      SD   494.23 55.48 480.52 443.70  211.57 157.18 276.64 349.20  
BELGIUM     Mean 27.48 -18.98 -46.46 346.19  67.29 9.86 -57.43 388.56  
      SD   534.43 55.01 515.49 484.62  216.42 86.39 221.68 253.91  
CANADA     Mean -15.56 -9.08 6.48 303.15  70.48 85.50 15.02 391.75  
      SD   383.19 40.84 375.80 403.98  155.80 75.01 155.17 267.03  
DENMARK     Mean 39.80 29.01 -10.78 358.51  177.12 219.63 42.51 498.39  
      SD   472.67 54.10 450.97 420.78  229.52 280.21 182.17 239.05  
FRANCE     Mean 21.16 -6.61 -27.78 339.87  60.64 87.56 26.92 381.91  
      SD   327.54 42.46 314.22 155.42  124.74 157.06 199.91 253.58  
GERMANY     Mean 3.97 22.60 18.64 322.68  54.34 -125.23 -179.57 375.61  
      SD   356.79 55.91 328.93 269.16  225.71 168.85 194.87 128.92  
ITALY     Mean 154.44 148.74 -5.70     473.15  -40.50 274.35 314.84 280.78  
      SD   470.49 98.46 473.03 411.58  255.11 265.03 367.79 412.17  
JAPAN     Mean 9.15 222.66 186.37 203.55  -85.27 -290.46 -205.19 236.00  
      SD   607.85 75.83 621.49 553.46  268.16 179.97 335.58 312.58  
NETHERLANDS     Mean 55.43 -16.86 -72.29 374.14  35.58 -77.80 -113.38 356.85  
      SD   498.19 52.06 482.03 427.72  209.28 140.13 210.99 200.56  
NORWAY     Mean -6.45 19.47 25.91 312.26  48.23 70.33 22.10 369.50  
      SD   415.13 41.92 394.12 383.65  259.13 158.07  282.17 272.13  
PORTUGAL     Mean 178.24 215.06 36.81 496.96  -303.32 331.06 634.38 17.95  
      SD   873.35 236.17 852.38 770.66  475.16 358.80 621.74 545.04  
SPAIN     Mean 259.98 445.19 -60.04 454.39  -81.95 254.96 336.91 239.32  
      SD   413.34 492.14 458.18 391.90  309.73 236.68 376.91 417.27  
SWEDEN     Mean 15.61 22.18 6.57 334.32  47.00 112.70 65.69 368.28  
      SD   504.39 44.58 488.70 442.96  217.23 151.47 247.79 264.17  
UK     Mean 0.35 -60.54 -60.90 319.07  15.22 159.07 143.85 336.49  
      SD   495.54 65.56 472.47 422.96  194.62 234.79 328.10 303.54  
US     Mean    318.71     321.27  
      SD      343.85     260.37  
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TABLE 3 
RIP convergence results (AR regression) 
Panel A: 1872-1914 
 
α t(α =0)   β t(β =1) 
 
t(β =0)  
AUSTRALIA 0.25 0.33   0.06 -6.05*  0.37  
BELGIUM 0.26 0.32   0.16 -5.53*  1.02  
CANADA -0.17 -0.29   -0.05 -6.91*  -0.36  
DENMARK 0.39 0.53   0.04 -6.29*  0.25  
FRANCE 0.19 0.39   0.27 -5.08*  1.87  
GERMANY 0.06 0.11   0.20 -5.49*  1.38  
ITALY 1.37 1.81   0.12 -5.71*  0.81  
JAPAN -0.02 -0.01   0.22 -3.40*  0.93  
NETHERLANDS 0.53 0.69   0.10 -6.20*  0.72  
NORWAY -0.03 -0.05   0.25 -5.01*  1.66  
PORTUGAL 1.89 1.38   -0.06 -6.81*  -0.40  
SPAIN 3.31   3.71*   -0.40 -7.65*  -2.17*  
SWEDEN 0.15 0.19   0.10 -5.84*  0.67  
UK 0.01 0.01   0.07 -6.12*  0.48  
 Panel B: 1974-2006 
 
α t(α =0)   β t(β =1) 
 
t(β =0)  
AUSTRALIA 0.19 0.69   0.66 -2.69*  5.12*  
BELGIUM 0.22 0.76   0.70 -2.36*  5.42*  
CANADA 0.54   2.01*   0.35 -4.11*  2.25*  
DENMARK 0.48 1.30   0.71 -2.25*  5.58*  
FRANCE 0.36 1.60   0.43 -3.51*  2.69*  
GERMANY 0.15 0.48   0.64 -2.61*  4.72*  
ITALY 0.03 0.14   0.80 -1.97   8.08*  
JAPAN -0.27 -0.65   0.55 -3.09*  3.77*  
NETHERLANDS 0.19 0.60   0.59 -2.85*  4.04*  
NORWAY 0.48 1.14   0.29 -4.39*  1.79  
PORTUGAL -0.72 -1.02   0.70 -2.37*  5.62*  
SPAIN -0.21 -0.52   0.69 -2.42*  5.31*  
SWEDEN 0.27 0.76   0.46 -3.41*  2.85*  
UK 0.10 0.30   0.15 -4.78*  0.87  
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  
* denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.  
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TABLE 4 
Nominal Interest Rate Differential convergence results (AR regression) 
Panel A: 1872-1914 
 
α t(α =0)   β t(β =1) 
 
t(β =0)  
AUSTRALIA 0.10 1.59   0.75 -2.45*  7.52*  
BELGIUM 0.02 0.49   0.89 -1.27  9.88*  
CANADA -0.01 -0.23   0.78 -2.24*  7.80*  
DENMARK 0.06 1.48   0.88 -1.69  12.13*  
FRANCE -0.01 -0.31   0.77 -2.24*  7.71*  
GERMANY 0.06 1.44   0.86 -2.04*  12.89*  
ITALY 0.12 0.95   0.89 -1.47  12.40*  
JAPAN 0.40 1.93   0.81 -2.10*  9.20*  
NETHERLANDS -0.01 -0.27   0.83 -2.02*  10.11*  
NORWAY 0.06 1.30   0.74 -2.58*  7.22*  
PORTUGAL 0.53 1.60   0.75 -2.43*  7.25*  
SPAIN 0.47 0.96   0.88 -1.56  11.84*  
SWEDEN 0.06 1.32   0.77 -2.37*  8.10*  
UK -0.02 -0.44   0.90 -1.77  15.31*  
 Panel B: 1974-2006 
 
α t(α =0)   β t(β =1) 
 
t(β =0)  
AUSTRALIA 0.48 1.74   0.73 -2.25*  6.12*  
BELGIUM -0.01 -0.10   0.72 -2.16*  5.43*  
CANADA 0.19 1.24   0.74 -1.89  5.45*  
DENMARK 0.05 0.16   0.91 -1.12  11.38*  
FRANCE -0.01 -0.04   0.90 -1.17  10.83*  
GERMANY -0.41 -2.08*   0.76 -2.55*  8.22*  
ITALY 0.37 0.99   0.86 -1.44  8.94*  
JAPAN -0.69 -2.17*   0.80 -2.18*  8.54*  
NETHERLANDS -0.23 -1.39   0.79 -2.07*  7.62*  
NORWAY 0.17 0.85   0.77 -2.01*  6.62*  
PORTUGAL 0.40 1.00   0.89 -1.39  11.01*  
SPAIN 0.24 0.66   0.87 -1.27  8.56*  
SWEDEN 0.16 0.76   0.82 -1.57  7.30*  
UK 0.07 0.29   0.88 -1.44  10.27*  
 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  
* denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.  
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TABLE 5 
Inflation Differential convergence results (AR regression) 
Panel A: 1872-1914 
 
α t(α =0)   β t(β =1) 
 
t(β =0)  
AUSTRALIA 0.05 0.06   0.00 -6.39*  0.00  
BELGIUM -0.43 -0.55   0.09 -5.90*  0.59  
CANADA 0.08 0.14   -0.10 -7.19*  -0.64  
DENMARK -0.11 -0.16   -0.05 -6.85*  -0.33  
FRANCE -0.24 -0.52   0.22 -5.40*  1.51  
GERMANY 0.17 0.33   0.07 -6.23*  0.45  
ITALY -0.07 -0.10   0.17 -5.47*  1.12  
JAPAN 1.31 0.94   0.30 -3.09*  1.36  
NETHERLANDS -0.70 -0.94   0.06 -6.47*  0.41  
NORWAY 0.20 0.34   0.18 -5.38*  1.17  
PORTUGAL 0.41 0.32   -0.11 -7.17*  -0.73  
SPAIN -0.42 -0.45   -0.19 -5.83*  -0.92  
SWEDEN 0.06 0.08   0.05 -6.14*  0.34  
UK -0.62 -0.85   -0.03 -6.66*  -0.17  
 Panel B: 1974-2006 
 
α t(α =0)   β t(β =1) 
 
t(β =0)  
AUSTRALIA 0.47 1.08   0.62 -2.69*  4.44*  
BELGIUM -0.23 -0.79   0.70 -2.37*  5.41*  
CANADA -0.01 -0.04   0.40 -3.83*  2.53*  
DENMARK 0.04 0.17   0.66 -2.58*  4.95*  
FRANCE -0.01 -0.05   0.71 -2.31*  5.56*  
GERMANY -0.75 -2.10*   0.62 -2.81*  4.60*  
ITALY 0.30 0.63   0.86 -1.40  8.78*  
JAPAN -0.86 -1.90   0.69 -2.67*  5.97*  
NETHERLANDS -0.50 -1.61   0.65 -2.68*  4.96*  
NORWAY 0.01 0.02   0.42 -3.64*  2.67*  
PORTUGAL 0.89 0.95   0.84 -1.58  8.00*  
SPAIN 0.51 0.94   0.81 -1.76  7.53*  
SWEDEN 0.22 0.59   0.60 -2.70*  4.10*  
UK 0.29 0.65   0.73 -2.15*  5.96*  
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  
* denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.  
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TABLE 6 
Real Interest Rate Reversion in Each Country (AR regression) 
Panel A: 1872-1914 
 
α t(α =0)   β t(β =1) 
 
t(β =0)  
AUSTRALIA 3.08 3.50*   0.11 -5.74*  0.68  
BELGIUM 3.04 3.34*   0.12 -5.65*  0.80  
CANADA 2.53 3.27*   0.16 -5.42*  1.06  
DENMARK 2.94 3.50*   0.18 -5.35*  1.17  
FRANCE 3.30 5.76*   0.03 -6.30*  0.19  
GERMANY 2.17 3.58*   0.33 -4.61*  2.28*  
ITALY 4.23 4.36*   0.11 -5.76*  0.68  
JAPAN 1.47 1.22   0.20 -3.38*  0.85  
NETHERLANDS 3.08 3.71*   0.19 -5.56*  1.28  
NORWAY 1.79 2.55*   0.42 -4.08*  2.97*  
PORTUGAL 5.53 3.91*   -0.11 -7.20*  -0.72  
SPAIN 5.21 4.72*   -0.23 -6.66*  -1.26  
SWEDEN 2.64 3.13*   0.21 -5.17*  1.38  
UK 3.45 4.18*   -0.08 -6.87*  -0.51  
US 1.49 2.39*   0.51 -3.71*  3.92*  
 Panel B: 1974-2006 
 
α t(α =0)   β t(β =1) 
 
t(β =0)  
AUSTRALIA 0.74 1.66   0.83 -1.95  9.24*  
BELGIUM 0.62 1.51   0.85 -1.67  9.74*  
CANADA 1.13 2.28*   0.74 -2.47*  7.19*  
DENMARK 1.00 1.64   0.80 -1.83  7.30*  
FRANCE 0.85 1.74   0.79 -1.99*  7.47*  
GERMANY 1.36 2.39*   0.64 -2.55*  4.53*  
ITALY 0.60 1.37   0.84 -1.82  9.64*  
JAPAN 0.95 2.00*   0.67 -2.75*  5.53*  
NETHERLANDS 0.71 1.95   0.82 -2.00*  9.35*  
NORWAY 1.89 3.21*   0.54 -3.61*  4.25*  
PORTUGAL 0.26 0.46   0.79 -2.05*  7.62*  
SPAIN 0.33 0.89   0.89 -1.41  11.77*  
SWEDEN 1.27 2.15*   0.67 -2.54*  5.17*  
UK 1.34 2.07*   0.61 -2.75*  4.28*  
US 0.65 1.52   0.81 -1.86  7.84*  
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  
* denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.  
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TABLE 7 
 Comovement Descriptive Statistics 
    Mean SD 
Mean 
1872-1914 
Mean 
1974-2006 
AUSTRALIA RIP_NID 0.06 0.77 0.17 -0.08 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.93 1.48 -1.42 -0.29 
BELGIUM RIP_NID 0.27 1.00 0.40 0.10 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.97 1.89 -1.51 -0.25 
CANADA RIP_NID 0.25 0.85 0.24 0.26 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.96 1.89 -1.52 -0.21 
DENMARK RIP_NID 0.42 1.02 0.21 0.70 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.84 2.26 -1.46 -0.01 
FRANCE RIP_NID 0.12 0.84 0.16 0.06 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.90 1.67 -1.43 -0.19 
GERMANY RIP_NID 0.30 0.99 0.24 0.37 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.89 1.72 -1.29 -0.37 
ITALY RIP_NID -0.07 0.75 -0.02 -0.13 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.89 1.80 -1.22 -0.45 
JAPAN RIP_NID 0.09 1.08 -0.02 0.30 
 
RIP_INFDIF -1.76 3.80 -2.76 0.09 
NETHERLANDS RIP_NID 0.23 0.70 0.24 0.22 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.96 1.96 -1.53 -0.20 
NORWAY RIP_NID 0.21 0.60 0.26 0.14 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.94 2.00 -1.29 -0.46 
PORTUGAL RIP_NID 0.00 0.88 0.15 -0.19 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.92 1.89 -1.20 -0.54 
SPAIN RIP_NID -0.05 0.73 -0.39 0.58 
 
RIP_INFDIF -1.78 2.64 -2.71 -0.07 
SWEDEN RIP_NID 0.17 0.65 0.21 0.12 
 
RIP_INFDIF -0.95 2.29 -1.46 -0.26 
UK RIP_NID 0.09 1.05 0.22 -0.07 
  RIP_INFDIF -0.88 1.68 -1.36 -0.25 
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FIGURE 1: Plots of nominal interest parity and inflation differentials 
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FIGURE 2: Comovements, 𝜌𝑡
𝑥𝑥, over the Gold Standard and Floating Periods 
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 APPENDIX – REAL INTEREST PARITY 
 
Real interest rate parity (RIP) in its strictest form simply states that the expected domestic 
real interest rate is equal to the expected foreign real interest rate:  
*
, 1 , 1t t t t t tE r E r+ +=   
where E is expectations, t denotes the time period, r is the real interest rate and an asterisk 
denotes the foreign country. 
The relationship can be theoretically defined if three conditions hold. First the Fisher 
equation must hold in both the domestic market and the foreign market. The Fisher equation 
states that the expected real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate minus expected 
inflation: 
, 1 , 1 , 1
* * *
, 1 , 1 , 1
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
E r i E
E r i E
π
π
+ + +
+ + +
= −
= −
  
Secondly, uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) must hold. UIP states that expected changes in 
the exchange rate are equal to the difference in nominal interest rates between the domestic 
and international market: 
( ) *1 , 1 , 1t t t t t t tE s s i i+ + +− = −  
Thirdly, relative purchasing power parity (RPPP) must hold. RPPP states that expected 
changes in the exchange rate are equal to the difference in inflation between the domestic and 
international market: 
( ) *1 , 1 , 1t t t t t t t t tE s s E Eπ π+ + +− = −  
Using these three conditions we start from the fisher equation in the domestic market. We 
then assume UIP and PPP holds so we can state that the real interest rate in the domestic 
33 
 
country equals the difference between the foreign nominal interest rate and the foreign 
expected inflation. By assuming the fisher effect holds in the foreign country we can replace 
the difference between the foreign nominal interest rate and the foreign expected inflation 
with the foreign real interest rate. 
 
( ) ( )
, 1 , 1 , 1
* *
, 1 , 1 1 , 1 1
* *
, 1 , 1 , 1
*
, 1 , 1
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
E r i E
E r i E s s E E s s
E r i E
E r E r
π
π
π
+ + +
+ + + + +
+ + +
+ +
= −
 = − − − − − 
= −
=
 
 
